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We develop a uniﬁed theory of endogenous business cycles in which expansions are neoclassical
growth periods driven by productivity improvements and capital accumulation, while down-
turns are the result of Keynesian contractions in aggregate demand below potential output.
Recessions allow skilled labor to be reallocated to growth—promoting activities which fuel sub-
sequent expansions. However, rigidities in production and contractual limitations, inherent
to the process of creative destruction, leave capital severely underutilized. A key feature of
our equilibrium is the endogenous emergence of long—term supply contracts between capitalist
owners and producers.
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1“The recurring periods of prosperity of the cyclical movement are the form progress takes in
capitalistic society.” (Joseph Schumpeter, 1927)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ad e ﬁning feature of the normal business cycle is the observed co—movement across diverse sectors
of the economy amongst both outputs and inputs to production.1 Indeed, sectoral co—movement
in output was one of the key characteristics discussed in the work of Burns and Mitchell (1946),
and forms the basis for the NBER’s business cycle dating methodology.2 Recently, Christiano
and Fitzgerald (1998) have documented the striking degree of co—movement in labor hours across
highly disaggregated sectors of the US economy. This sectoral co—movement has long been recog-
nized, at least informally, by macroeconomists. For example, Schumpeter (1927) argued that the
key to understanding business cycles was to understand why entrepreneurial activity would be
clustered over time. Similarly, Keynes (1936) emphasized the role of co—movement in investment
behavior – encapsulated in his notion of “animal spirits” – as a key causal factor in the business
cycle.
Despite these observations, mainstream macroeconomic analysis has, in recent decades, tended
to put aside questions regarding the causes of co—movement and, instead, has largely focussed on
the propagation mechanisms implied by various aggregate shocks. In particular, the real business
cycle literature emphasizes the response of the economy to aggregate technology shocks in driving
short—run ﬂuctuations. However, while technology shocks may be important at the ﬁrm level, it
is not obvious why they would be important for economy—wide aggregate output ﬂuctuations.
As Lucas (1981) reasons, positive technology shocks for some ﬁrms would surely be oﬀset by
negative shocks for others. Even if one were to accept the existence of aggregate technology
shocks as a driving force in the co—movement of outputs across sectors, standard RBC models
still have trouble explaining the observed co—movement in inputs across sectors. In particular, as
has been pointed out recently (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1998, Siu, 1999), standard RBC models
imply that hours worked in the consumption goods sector are inherently counter—cyclical.3
1In using the expression “normal business cycle” we are borrowing from Schumpeter (1927, p. 288), who
distinguishes such cycles from seasonal ﬂuctuations, “long waves” and secular trends.
2“... a recession is a period of decline in total output, income, employment, and trade, usually lasting
from six months to a year, and marked by widespread contractions in many sectors of the economy.” (see
http://www.NBER.org/cycles.html).
3Several papers, including Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001),
1There are, however, good reasons why economic activity might be correlated across diﬀerent
industries, even in the absence of aggregate shocks. In the presence of imperfect competition,
for example, the implementation of a productivity improvement by one ﬁrm may increase the
demand for anothers’ products by raising aggregate demand. In a dynamic general equilibrium
setting, Shleifer (1986) shows that this may induce innovators, who anticipate short-lived proﬁts,
to implement simultaneously, thereby generating self—enforcing booms in activity. Unfortunately,
as a vehicle for understanding actual business cycles, Shleifer’s model suﬀers from a number
of serious limitations. Firstly, the multiplicity of equilibria that arise yield rather imprecise
predictions for the cyclical process. Secondly, the temporary nature of proﬁts relies on the ad
hoc assumption of drastic, but costless imitation. Thirdly, his cycle features only booms and
slowdowns, but no downturns. Finally, Shleifer’s theory depends critically on the impossibility of
any type of storage (including physical capital).4
In Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), we demonstrate how a similar endogenous cyclical process
can arise through a process of “creative destruction” familiar from Schumpeterian growth models.
Like imitation, potential obsolescence limits the longevity of proﬁts and provides incentives to
cluster implementation. We show that when productive resources are needed to generate new
innovations, allowing for the possibility of storage does not rule out cycles, and in fact yields a
unique cyclical equilibrium.5 Moreover, because this costly innovation tends to be clustered just
before a boom, it causes a downturn in aggregate output (even if the measure of GDP includes
this investment). Although promising, our earlier model allowed investment only in intangible
assets (i.e. “ideas”). This limits its applicability because ﬂuctuations in tangible capital formation
(and its utilization) are, obviously, a key characteristic of the business cycle.6
The omission of physical capital from our earlier paper was not innocuous. If consumption—
smoothing households have access to fully reversible and continuously variable physical capital,
they would “eat” it in anticipation of a boom, thereby undermining the existence of cycles where
delay plays an important role. As Matsuyama (1999) notes, this is true more generally of work
d e v e l o pe x t e n d e dR B Cf r a m e w o r k si nw h i c hh o u r sw o r k e di nthe consumption sector need not be counter-cyclical.
As will be seen this problem need not arise in our framework either. We discuss this issue in Section 7.
4If they could, innovators would choose to produce when costs are low (i.e. before the boom), store the output
and then sell it when demand is high (i.e. in the boom). Such a pattern of production would undermine the
existence of cycles.
5Shleifer (1986) assumes that innovations arise exogenously. When innovation is endogenous, growth is inti-
mately related to the business cycle.
6A related limitation of that model is that for realistic long—run growth rates, the existence of the cyclical
equilibrium requires unrealistically high values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 3 or above.
2featuring agglomeration with implementation delay (Shleifer 1986, Deneckere and Judd 1992,
and Gale 1996). The results of such models are not robust to allowing the accumulation of (fully
reversible) physical capital. Matsuyama’s (1999, 2001) resolution of this impasse is to develop
a model of endogenous cycles with physical capital, but without implementation delays. His
model features increasing returns in production (as in Romer, 1990), exogenous imitation (as in
Shleifer, 1986), and a ﬁxed entry cost for new ﬁrms. This results in a growth process in which the
economy ﬂuctuates between periods of high capital accumulation coupled with low total factor
productivity (TFP) growth, and periods of high TFP growth but little accumulation of capital.
While this model is useful as a tool for understanding longer term phenomena (e.g. East Asian
post war growth and the US productivity slowdown), it has a number of shortcomings when
applied to business cycle frequency ﬂuctuations. In particular, sectoral contractions in output
– a key aggregate feature of normal business cycles – are absent from this process. Similarly,
consumption never actually falls in absolute terms and factors of production are always fully
utilized.7
Here we consider an alternative approach that allows for physical capital, but preserves the
implementation delays emphasized by previous authors. Speciﬁcally, we develop a model of
innovation—driven endogenous growth in which capital is irreversible, putty-clay and lumpy. Our
emphasis on the rigidities of installed capital is consistent with our focus on normal business
cycles rather than secular trends and, as we will demonstrate, generates dynamics that are quali-
tatively consistent with key features of the data at this frequency. Moreover, there is considerable
direct evidence that many types of physical investment are not reversible and feature putty-clay
characteristics (see Ramey and Shapiro, 2001, Kasahara, 2002). Doms and Dunne (1993) have
also documented the considerable “lumpiness” of plant level investments, while Cabellero and
Engel (1998) have demonstrated the high skewness and kurtosis observed in aggregate invest-
ment data.8 Moreover, the variation in “shiftwork” over the business cycle (see Bresnahan and
Ramey 1994, Hamermesh 1989 and Mayshar and Solon, 1993) is consistent with the putty—clay
assumption, since it implies that capital is being used less intensively during recessions than is
7There is a large literature on endogenous cycles and growth. However, most previous work has been restricted
to single sector settings, which also seems more consistent with the analysis of general purpose technologies and
longer term, secular trends. See Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 8) and Lloyd-Ellis and Francois (2003) for more
extensive discussions of this literature.
8A related literature emphasizes the role of plant level investment irreversibilities. However, recent work (see
Veracierto, 2002 and Thomas 2002,) in the RBC tradition has found that the eﬀects of such irreversibilities at the
aggregate level are virtually non—existent.
3optimal ex ante.
We characterize an endogenous stationary cyclical equilibrium that features dramatic shifts
in economy—wide investment behavior through the cycle. Expansions are “neoclassical”, supply—
side phenomena which directly raise both potential output, through the delayed implementation
of productivity improvements, and actual output through increased labor eﬀort and subsequent
capital accumulation. Recessions are “Keynesian” demand—side contractions during which ac-
tual output falls below its potential and some capital resources are left under—utilized. These
reductions in aggregate demand are not autonomous, however. Rather they are an equilibrium
response to the anticipated future expansion, as eﬀort shifts into long—run growth promoting
activities, and out of current production.9
In addition to an endogenous treatment of growth, our model endogenously generates the
following qualitative behavior of key aggregates and prices over the business cycle:
• Implementation of innovations is strongly pro—cyclical, so that total factor productivity rises
during booms, but remains constant during downturns.
• Labour productivity is strongly pro—cyclical.
• Wages rise during booms and expansions, but do not fall during contractions.
• Investment and consumption are strongly pro—cyclical, but investment is more volatile. Invest-
ment is strongly correlated with output and sales growth.
• Labor and capital inputs into consumption and investment sectors are both pro—cyclical.
• Capacity utilization is strongly pro—cyclical.
• Proﬁts are strongly pro—cyclical.
• Term spread is ﬂat during expansions and steep midway through contractions.
• Marginal Q is strongly pro—cyclical, but because the stock market anticipates the boom, the
cyclicality of Tobin’s average Q tends to be more complex.
A crucial feature of the equilibrium growth path that we study is the endogenous emergence
of optimal long term supply contracts between capital owners (e.g. banks) and entrepreneurs.
Contractual agreements negotiated between the two parties are necessarily limited because the
process of creative destruction implies that an entrepreneur’s productivity advantage terminates
when replaced by superior innovators in their sectors.10 The parties can, however, enter into long
9This has the ﬂavor of the so—called “paradox of thrift”: current savings are chanelled into investments whose
return will not be realized until the long run (when, according to Keynes (1936), “we are all dead”).
10The growth implications of incomplete contracting have been explored recently in a number of papers: Marti-
mort and Verdier (2000) explore the growth implications of cooperative non-productive behavior between owners
4term binding arrangements that specify both the quantity and price of capital to be transacted,
conditional upon the relationship continuing. As we shall see, the existence of contracts between
intermediate producers and capital suppliers, also precipitates the emergence of contracts between
ﬁnal goods producers and their intermediate suppliers.
We defer discussion of previous literature on growth and cycles until after the paper’s main
results are presented. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the framework, Section 3
characterizes the cycling steady state, Section 4 presents the necessary conditions for existence of
the steady state and Section 5 provides numerical examples of cycling economies, and comparative
statics. Section 6 deals with the model’s dynamics and Section 7 concludes with a discussion of
the main implications. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
There is no aggregate uncertainty. Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. We consider a closed







where ρ denotes the rate of time preference and σ represents the inverse of the elasticity of







where w(t) denotes wage income, S(t) denotes the household’s stock of assets (ﬁrm shares and
capital) at time t and R(t) denotes the discount factor from time zero to t. The population is
normalized to unity and each household is endowed with one unit of labor hours, which it supplies
inelastically.
Final output can be used for the production of consumption, C(t), investment, ˙ K(t),o rc a n
be stored at an arbitrarily small ﬂow cost of ν>0 per unit time. It is produced by competitive
ﬁrms according to a Cobb—Douglas production function utilizing a continuum of intermediates,
and workers. Francois and Roberts (2002) show that the productivity slowdown, and a number of accompanying
labor market changes can be explained in an endogenous growth framework featuring such incomplete contracting.
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002,2003) explore the implications for such incompleteness for LDC development.
5xi, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]:






For simplicity we also assume that there is no physical depreciation.
Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i, Ai (t), utilized
capital, Ku
i (t), which cannot exceed the stock of installed capital, Ki(t),a n dl a b o rh o u r s ,Li(t),










i (t)=κi (z)Li (t) <K i(t)
(4)
where κi(z) is the capital—labor ratio chosen at z<t , the time at which the last increment
to capital was installed. The unit measure of labor hours is perfectly mobile across sectors
and inelastically supplied by households in aggregate. However, the amount of this supply that is
used in production of intermediates potentially varies due to its opportunity cost in an alternative
activity, speciﬁed shortly. Installed capital, Ki(t) , is sector—speciﬁc and is owned by “capitalists”
who rent it to entrepreneurs at the rate qi (t). Installed capital is non-divisible so that any part
of it that is not utilized cannot be used elsewhere.11 Once installed, sector—speciﬁc capital is
irreversible, ˙ Ki ≥ 0, as well as putty-clay. We assume that intermediates are completely used up
in production, but can be produced and stored for use at a later date. Incumbent intermediate
producers must therefore decide whether to sell now, or store and sell later at the ﬂow storage
cost ν.
An implication of this structure is that during an expansion, when new capital is being built,
ﬁrms can choose (K,L) combinations along the Cobb—Douglas production isoquants (curved in
Figure 1) and choose an optimal capital—labor ratio that reﬂects relative factor prices. However
during a contraction, if labor is removed and the ﬁrm produces below capacity, production must
utilize factors along a ray from the chosen point on the full-capacity isoquant, which reﬂects the
same factor ratios. In such a situation, the installed capital is used less intensively in proportion
to the labor hours allocated to production. One interpretation of this is that there are fewer
shifts.
This production set up implies that if ﬁrms were to reduce output below capacity, one of the
following three outcomes must occur:
11For similar examples of putty-clay capital, see Johansen (1959), Gilchrist and Williams (2000) and Kasahara
(2003). Evidence of underutilization is widespread: for example, Bils and Cho (1994) and Basu (1996).
6(1) the entire stock of capital is rented to another (presumably more productive) entrepreneur, if
one exists;
(2) capital is fully utilized, but some output is stored to be sold later, or
(3) the installed capital remains in place but is under—utilized, Ku
i (t) <K i (t).
Along the cyclical growth path that we will study here, only outcome (3) turns out to be consistent







Figure 1: Implications of Irreversibility and Putty—Clay Technology
2.1.1 Innovation
Competitive entrepreneurs in each sector attempt to ﬁnd ongoing marginal improvements in
productivity by allocating labor eﬀort to innovation rather than production.12 They ﬁnance their
activities by selling equity shares to households. The probability of an entrepreneurial success in
instant t is δHi(t), where δ is a parameter, and Hi is the labor eﬀort allocated to innovation in
sector i. At any point in time, entrepreneurs decide whether or not to allocate labor eﬀort to




12All of the labor considered here is skilled and capable of substituting between the two activities. We discuss
the implications of allowing unskilled labor in the concluding section.
7New ideas and innovations dominate old ones by a factor eγ. Successful entrepreneurs must
choose whether or not to implement their innovation immediately or delay implementation until
al a t e rd a t e . 13 Once they implement, the knowledge associated with their improvement becomes
publicly available, and can be built upon by rival entrepreneurs. However, prior to implementa-
tion, the knowledge is privately held by the entrepreneur.14 We let the indicator function Zi(t)
take on the value 1 if there exists a successful innovation in sector i which has not yet been
implemented, and 0 otherwise. The set of instants in which entrepreneurial successes are imple-
mented in sector i is denoted by Ωi.W e l e t V I
i (t) denote the expected present value of proﬁts
from implementing a success at time t,a n dV D
i (t) denote that of delaying implementation from
time t until the most proﬁtable time in future.
2.1.2 Contracts
The nature of innovation is such that entrepreneurs cannot simply “sell” their ideas to capitalists,
but must be involved in its implementation themselves. We assume that entrepreneurs do not have
the wealth required to purchase the capital stock needed to implement, and hence must borrow
from the capitalists. In eﬀect, there is a separation of ownership and control with respect to the
capital stock of the ﬁrm, which may necessitate the writing of a long—term capital supply contract.
The eﬀective user cost of capital is the outcome of such a contractual relationship between the
entrepreneur and the capitalists in each sector. Incumbent capital owners are limited in the extent
of their monopoly pricing by the threat of “replacement” capital being built in their sector.15
Capital Supply Contracts: Intermediate producers and capital owners in every sector i can
contract over a future binding utilized capital level, Ku
i (τ), and a price for each unit of utilized
capital, qi (τ), for all τ up to a chosen contract termination date, TK
i . Thus a contract signed at
time t is a tuple
n
{Ku
i (τ),q i (τ)}τ∈[t,TK
i ] ,T K
i
o
.16 Since the productive advantage of an inter-
13As in Francois and Lloyd—Ellis (2003) we adopt a broad interpretation of innovation. Recently, Comin (2002)
has estimated that the contribution of measured R&D to productivity growth in the US is less that 1/2 of 1%. As
he notes, a larger contribution is likely to come from unpatented managerial and organizational innovations.
14Even for the case of intellectual property, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) show that ﬁrms make extensive use
of secrecy in protecting productivity improvements. Secrecy likely plays a more prominent role for entrepreneurial
innovations, which are the key here.
15In order to maintain competition in capital supply it will be assumed that, in the event of a competing capital
stock being built, ties in tended prices are always broken in favour of the entrant. Due to storage costs, entry of
replacement capital will imply scrapping of the pre-existing stock.
16Identical results obtain if instead of specifying the time-varying utilization rate of capital, K
u
i (τ), contracts
can only be written over K (τ).
8mediate producer lasts only until a superior technology is implemented in that sector, contracts
allow the termination of agreements before TK
i if shutting down production. Otherwise, the
parties can break contracts only by mutual agreement.
Although supply contracts with particular entrepreneurs only last until their ideas become
obsolete, capitalist owners can retain their incumbency permanently (subject to competition
from other capitalists). The present value of the capitalist’s net income in sector i under the
utilization—price sequence {Ku










i (τ) − ˙ Ki(τ)
i
dτ. (5)
Intermediate Supply Contracts: Final goods producers are also able to contract intermediate
good deliveries from each of the intermediate producing sectors, i. Such contracts written at t
involve a similar tuple:
n
{xi (τ),p i (τ)}τ∈[t,TX
i ] ,T X
i
o
where the unit price is pi (t) and the
contract termination date is TX
i . Contracts can be altered under the same conditions as in capital
contracts.17 The value of ﬁnal goods producers is denoted V Y (t).
2.2 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Given initial state variables18 {Ai(0),Z i(0),K i (0)}1
i=0, an equilibrium for this economy is:














(2) a sequence of intermediate supply contracts
n
b TX








b Ki(t), b Li(t), b Hi(t), b Ai(t), b Zi(t), b V I
i (t), b V D





mediate sector i, and
(4) economy wide sequences
n
b Y (t), b R(t), b w(t), b V Y (t), b C (t), b S (t)
o
t∈[0,∞)
which satisfy the following conditions:
• Households allocate consumption over time to maximize (1) subject (2). The ﬁrst—order con-
ditions of the household’s optimization require that
b C(t)σ = b C(τ)σe
b R(t)−b R(τ)−ρ(t−τ) ∀ t,τ, (6)
and that the transversality condition holds
lim
τ→∞e−b R(τ)b S(τ)=0 (7)
17Though conceptually feasible, contracts written over the supply of labor and ﬁnal output are redundant in the
equilibria we study and will not be considered further.
18Without loss of generality, we assume no stored output at time 0.
9• Labor markets clear: Z 1
0
b Li(t)di + b H(t)=1 (8)
• Arbitrage trading in ﬁnancial markets implies that for all assets that are held in strictly positive
amounts by households, the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
b R(s)−b R(t)
s−t .
• Free entry into innovation – entrepreneurs select the sector in which they innovate so as to
maximize the expected present value of the innovation, and
δ max[b V D
i (t), b V I
i (t)] ≤ b w(t), b Hi(t) ≥ 0 with at least one equality. (9)
• At instants where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to im-
plement rather that delay until a later date
b V I
i (t) ≥ b V D
i (t) ∀ t ∈ b Ωi. (10)
• At instants where there is no implementation, either there must be no innovations available to
implement, or entrepreneurs with innovations must prefer to delay rather than implement:
Either b Zi(t)=0 , (11)
or if b Zi(t)=1 , b V I
i (t) ≤ b V D
i (t) ∀ t/ ∈ b Ωi.
• For all capital supply contracts written at date t, the equilibrium contract is such that no
other contract dominates for the capitalist and all existing entrepreneurs indexed by technologies




i (t), b V D
i (t)
i
+ b V K








∀ mutually determined V J
i 6= b V J
i ,J = I,D,K. (13)
• For all intermediate supply contracts written at date t, the equilibrium contract is such that no




i (t), b V D
i (t)
i






+ V Y (t), (14)
∀ mutually determined V J
i 6= b V J
i ,J = I,D,K, (15)
where V Y (t) holds contracts with other intermediate suppliers ﬁxed.
• Free entry into ﬁnal output production: b V Y (t) ≤ 0
• Free entry of replacement capital: b V K
i (t) ≤ b Ki (t)
103 The Acyclical Balanced Growth Path
In this section, we brieﬂy consider the existence of an equilibrium growth path along which the
utilized capital of ﬁrms grows monotonically, entrepreneurship is continuous and implementation
is never delayed. We derive the equilibrium without utilizing long—term contracts, so that all
transactions occur in spot markets, since it will be seen that allowing for them does not aﬀect the
equilibrium. While the acyclical growth path is not our main focus, it is useful for understanding
our later results.







where r(t)= ˙ R(t), denotes the continuous time interest rate. In the absence of uncertainty or
adjustment costs, and as long as utilized capital is anticipated to grow, capitalists never acquire
more capital than is needed for production, so that
Ku
i (t)=Ki(t). (17)
Within each sector, i, the existence of potential capital entrants implies that capital owners cannot
earn excess returns on marginal units. Hence:
Lemma 1 : As long as new capital is being built, free—entry into capital markets implies that
qi (t)=q(t)=r(t) ∀ i. (18)
Final goods producers choose intermediates to maximize proﬁts, taking their prices as given.






The unit elasticity of demand for intermediates implies that limit pricing, which drives out the
previous incumbent, is optimal:






where µ = αα(1 − α)1−α.
11The resulting instantaneous proﬁt earned in each sector is given by
π(t)=( 1− e−(1−α)γ)Y (t). (21)









. Along the acyclical steady—state growth path, a constant
fraction of the labor force is allocated to entrepreneurship. The standard solution method yields
the following steady state implication:
Proposition 1 : If
(1 − e−(1−α)γ)γ(1 − σ)




then there exists an acyclical equilibrium with a constant growth rate given by
ga =m a x
"
[δ(1 − e−(1−α)γ) − ρ(1 − α)e−(1−α)γ]γ
1 − αe−(1−α)γ − γ (1 − σ)(1− α)e−(1−α)γ,0
#
. (24)
Along this equilibrium growth path, the inequality in (23) implies that r(t) >g a(t) at every
moment. Along a balanced growth path, this condition must hold for the transversality condition
to be satisﬁed and hence for utility to be bounded. However, this condition also ensures both
that no output is stored, and that the implementation of any innovation is never delayed (see
Francois and Lloyd—Ellis, 2003, for further elaboration). Allowing long—term supply contracts
would only undermine the existence of this equilibrium growth path if contracting for non-spot
market prices could make both parties to a contract better oﬀ. However, since all quantities are
chosen optimally in the spot market in this equilibrium, such contracts would necessarily involve
one side being made worse oﬀ.
4 T h eP o s i t e dC y c l i c a lG r o w t hP a t h
In this section, we begin by informally positing a cyclical equilibrium growth path in which, due
to the rigid nature of capital, under—utilization may occur during downturns. We then posit the
equilibrium behavior for capitalists and entrepreneurs over the cycle and detail the implications for
contracting, consumption and aggregate entrepreneurship. In Section 5, we derive more formally
the implications of this behavior over each phase of the cycle, and Section 6 then demonstrates
12the consistency of the posited behavior of entrepreneurs and capitalists in an equilibrium steady

















Figure 2: Evolution of Key Aggregates over the Cycle
Figures 2 and 3 depict the movement of key variables during the cycle. Cycles are indexed by
the subscript v, and feature a consistently recurring pattern through their phases. The vth cycle
features three distinct phases:
• The expansion is triggered by a productivity boom at time Tv−1 and continues through subse-
quent capital accumulation, leading to continued growth in output, consumption and wages. Over
this expansion phase the interest rate falls and investment, though positive, declines as the capi-
tal stock rises. Also, since labor’s productivity in manufacturing intermediates is relatively high,
no labor is allocated to entrepreneurship. Through time, continued capital accumulation lowers
returns to further investment, rendering entrepreneurship relatively more attractive. Eventually
innovation and reorganization re-commence, drawing labor hours from production. At this point,
the return on investment in physical assets drops to zero, and investment ceases temporarily.
• The contraction starts with a collapse in ﬁxed capital formation at time TE
v as investment shifts















Figure 3: Evolution of Prices over Cycle
gate demand and then optimally re-allocate resources to relatively labor intensive entrepreneurial
reorganization in order to raise productivity for the forthcoming boom. Due to irreversibility
and the putty-clay nature of installed capital, labor’s departure from production implies that
capital cannot be fully utilized. Through the downturn, capital utilization falls and is traded at a
constant price. Innovation and reorganization continue to increase throughout this phase so that
the economy continues to contract through declining consumption expenditure.
• The boom occurs at an endogenously determined date, Tv, when the value of implementing
stored innovations ﬁrst exceeds the value of delaying their implementation. At that point, all
entrepreneurs implement their successful innovation, starting the upswing once again. During
the boom the returns to production rise above those of innovation and re—organization, drawing
skilled labor out of entrepreneurship and into production. Returns to capital also rise with the
new more productive technologies, so that capital accumulation recommences and the cycle begins
again.
144.1 Contracts
Because competition from replacement capitalists weakens during a recession, contracts arise
endogenously as capitalists compete to oﬀer guaranteed prices to capital users in advance of
the downturn. At this point, we anticipate the form these contracts will take and derive their
implications. In Section 6 we shall verify that these contracts are constrained optimal given
these implications. Contracts are written during the expansion of each cycle and terminate just
before the boom of the next. Contracts between intermediate and ﬁnal goods producers specify
a sequence of quantities and prices for intermediates through the cycle. These contracted prices
reﬂect the marginal costs of the main competitor: the previous incumbent holding the next best
technology. The prices and quantities agreed to in the intermediate goods contract take the same














∀t ∈ [Tv−1,T v). (26)
Through the upturn, contracts between capitalists and entrepreneurs specify steady expan-
sion in each sector’s capital stock, with capital being traded at a declining market—clearing price.
During a contraction, the contracts specify a ﬁxed rental price for capital and a declining utiliza-
tion rate. The equilibrium contracts are written before TE
v−1 over rental rate and utilized capital
{qc
i (t),Kc




























∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v),
(28)
where λ(t) < 1 denotes the utilization rate. Note that the posited contracts are symmetric across
sectors. In fact, as we will see, a contract specifying a constant price through the downturn is
not necessary. What will be required is that the price sequence is such that its average equals a
unique value. However, a constant price with this property is an equilibrium, and if there is any
arbitrarily small cost to price adjustment it is unique.
154.2 Consumption
Over intervals during which the discount factor does not jump, consumption is allocated as
described by (16). However along the cyclical growth path, the discount rate jumps at the
boom, so that consumption exhibits a discontinuity during implementation periods. We therefore
characterize the optimal evolution of consumption from the beginning of one cycle to the beginning




= R(Tv) − R(Tv−1) − ρ(Tv − Tv−1). (29)
where the 0 subscript is used to denote values of variables the instant after the implementation
boom. Note that a suﬃcient condition for the boundedness of the consumer’s optimization
problem is that ln
C0(Tv)






<ρ ∀ v. (30)
I no u ra n a l y s i sb e l o w ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt od e ﬁne the discount factor that will be used to discount
from some time t during the cycle to the beginning of the next cycle. This discount factor is given
by





Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv, no entrepreneurial success has been made
in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no entrepreneurial success by
time Tv+1 conditional on there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv+1)/Pi(t). Hence,
the value of an incumbent ﬁrm in a sector where no entrepreneurial success has occurred by time












The ﬁrst term here represents the discounted proﬁt stream that accrues to the entrepreneur with
certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected discounted value of being
an incumbent thereafter.
16Lemma 3 In a cyclical equilibrium, successful entrepreneurs can credibly signal a success imme-
diately and all entrepreneurship in their sector will stop until the next round of implementation.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs’ conjectures ensure no more entrepreneurship in
a sector once a signal of success has been received, until after the next implementation. The










Since no implementation occurs during the cycle, the entrepreneur is assured of incumbency until
at least Tv+1. Incumbency beyond that time depends on the probability that there has not been
another entrepreneurial success in that sector up until then.19 The symmetry of sectors implies
that entrepreneurial eﬀort is allocated evenly over all sectors that have not yet experienced a
success within the cycle. This clearly depends on some sectors not having already received
an entrepreneurial innovation, an equilibrium condition that will be imposed subsequently (see










where e Hi(τ) denotes the quantity of labor that would be allocated to entrepreneurship if no
entrepreneurial success had occurred prior to time τ in sector i. The amount of entrepreneurship
varies over the cycle, but at the beginning of each cycle all industries are symmetric with respect
to this probability: Pi(Tv)=P(Tv) ∀i.
5 The Three Phases of the Cycle
5.1 The (Neoclassical) Expansion
We denote the improvement in aggregate productivity during implementation period Tv (and,






19A signal of further entrepreneurial success submitted by an incumbent is not credible in equilibrium because
incumbents have incentive to lie to protect their proﬁt stream. No such incentive exists for entrants since, without
a success, proﬁts are zero.




. Following an implementation boom, the state of technology in
use remains unchanged for the rest of the cycle. An implication of the Cobb—Douglas structure
is that, through competition, the unit factor price index simply reﬂects this level of technology.
Lemma 4 : The input price index for t ∈ [Tv−1,TE





A sar e s u l to ft h eb o o m ,w a g e sr i s er a p i d l y .S i n c et h en e x ti m p l e m e n t a t i o nb o o mi ss o m et i m e
away, the present value of engaging in entrepreneurship falls below the wage, δV D(t) <w (t).
During this phase, no labor is allocated to entrepreneurship and no new innovations come on
line. However, ﬁnal output grows in response to capital accumulation ﬁnanced from household
savings. In equilibrium the Euler equation and aggregate resource constraint imply dynamics
that are almost identical to those of the Ramsey model:20











v−1K(t)α − C(t). (38)




Thus, as capital accumulates, the interest rate declines. Since technology is unchanging, Lemma














During the expansion, the expected value of entrepreneurship, δV D(t), is necessarily growing
at the rate of interest, but continues to be dominated by the wage in production. After enough
capital has been accumulated, however, δV D(t) eventually equals w(t).A t t h i s p o i n t , i f a l l
workers were to remain in production, returns to entrepreneurship would strictly dominate those
in production. As a result labor hours are re—allocated from production and into innovation,
which triggers the contractionary phase.
20Note that, unlike the Ramsey model, the rate of return on savings is not equal to the marginal product of
capital, but rather is a fraction e
−(1−α)γ of it. This reﬂects the entrepreneurial share of this marginal product
accruing as a monopoly rent.
185.2 The (Keynesian) Contraction
Because of the putty—clay nature of capital, as labor starts to be withdrawn from production the
capital—labor ratio cannot be adjusted from κ(TE
v ) and output must contract. Since technology
is also ﬁxed during this phase, the wage must be constant:
Lemma 5 : The wage for t ∈ [TE
v ,T v] is constant and determined by the level of technology and
the capital—labor ratio chosen at the last peak, κ(TE
v ):




Since there is free entry into entrepreneurship, w(t)=δV D(t), so that the value of en-
trepreneurship, δV D(t), is also constant. Since the time until implementation for a successful
entrepreneur is falling and there is no stream of proﬁts, because implementation is delayed, the
instantaneous interest rate necessarily equals zero. If it were not, entrepreneurial activity would








Note that this zero interest rate is consistent with the fact there is now excess (under—utilized)
capital in the economy. Since marginal returns to capital in this phase are zero, physical invest-
ment ceases and the only investment is that in innovation, undertaken by entrepreneurs.
Lemma 6 : At TE
v , investment in physical capital falls discretely to zero and entrepreneurship
jumps discretely to H0(TE
v ) > 0.
A switch like this across types of investment is also a feature of the models of Matsuyama
(1999, 2001) and Walde (2002). However, here factor intensity diﬀerences between entrepreneur-
ship and investment lead to a crash in output followed by continued decline through the recession.
Although investment falls discretely at t = TE
v , consumption must be constant across the tran-
sition between phases because the discount factor does not change discretely. With putty—clay
technology, the decline in output due to the fall in investment demand is proportional to the
fraction of labor hours withdrawn from production. It follows that the fraction of labor hours
19allocated to entrepreneurship at the start of the downturn, H0(TE
v ), w h i c hw ed e n o t ea sHv from




















Although consumption cannot fall discretely at TE
v , the zero interest rate implies that consump-











as resources ﬂow out of production and into entrepreneurship.
Since Y (t)=C (t), the growth rate in the hours allocated to production is also given by (44)
and so aggregate entrepreneurship at time t is given by




Note that the putty—clay nature of capital implies that as labor leaves current production, capital
utilization falls in the same proportion. It follows that the capital utilization rate speciﬁed in the






During the downturn, in the absence of a capital contract, entrepreneurs would be vulnerable
to an increasing rental price through the downturn. To see why, observe that, in order to forestall







q(τ)Ku(τ) − ˙ K(τ)
i
dτ + e−β(Tv)V K (K(t),T v) ≤ K(t), (47)
where V K (K(t),τ) denotes the value of the installed capital at time τ. During the downturn















21Although r =0 , strict preference for zero storage results from the arbitrarily small storage costs.
20However competition from potential replacement capitalists at the beginning of the next cycle





v ). Dividing by K(TE
v ) and re—arranging, using (46), yields






v )dτ ≤ 1 − e−β(Tv). (49)
The right hand side of this expression is constant throughout the downturn, but the left—hand
side would be decreasing through the downturn if q(t) were constant. It follows that, in the
absence of a contracted price, the capitalist could raise q through the downturn and still satisfy
(49).
The main implication of this is that, without a contract written before TE
v delineating the price
charged by the capitalist for the remainder of the cycle, entrepreneurs will face an increasing rental
rate for capital through the downturn. Given the potential for such price gouging, entrepreneurs
will demand the writing of such contracts before TE
v , when the cost of replacement capital is low.
The ﬁrst thing to note about any such contract is that it must satisfy the capital feasibility
constraint above, which will bind at t = TE
v :
Lemma 7 Any capital supply contract {qc
i(τ),Ku








v )dτ =1− e−β(Tv) (50)
There are a number of price sequences qc(t) that could satisfy this condition, however the
average level of prices through t ∈ [Tv−1,TE















Using 50, and integrating the denominator through the downturn, ∆E










A further feature of such contracts is that they must induce a cost minimizing capital/labor
ratio, in order again to forestall entry by competing capital providers. The standard marginal
condition applies at every instant through the upturn. With putty/clay capital and zero dis-
counting through the downturn, it is possible to treat the whole of the contractionary phase as if
21it were a single production period. Consequently, a condition analogous to the standard marginal

















=1 , it follows that:
Proposition 3 For a capital—supply contract to be eﬃcient through the downturn it is necessary






v )α−1 = q. (53)
Equating (52) and (53), substituting for 1 − Hv using (43), it follows that the capital—






















is also the eﬀective capital stock at the beginning of the next boom since there
is no depreciation and no capital is accumulated through the recession.
5.3 The Boom
Productivity growth at the boom is given by Γv =( 1−P(Tv))γ,w h e r eP(Tv) is deﬁn e db y( 3 4 ) .
Substituting in the allocation of labor to entrepreneurship through the downturn given by (45)
and letting
∆E
v = Tv − TE
v , (55)
yields the following implication.
Proposition 4 : In an equilibrium where there is positive entrepreneurship only over the interval
(TE
v ,T v], the growth in productivity during the succeeding boom is given by
Γv = δγ∆E









22For an entrepreneur who is holding an innovation, V I(t) is the value of implementing imme-





recalling that 0 subscripts denote values immediately after implementation. Just prior to the
boom, when the probability of displacement is negligible, the value of implementing immediately
must equal that of delaying until the boom:
δV I(Tv)=δV D(Tv)=w(Tv). (58)
From (57), the return to entrepreneurship at the boom is the value of immediate (rather than
delayed) incumbency. It follows that free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom requires that
δV I
0 (Tv) ≤ w0 (Tv). (59)
The opportunity cost of ﬁnancing entrepreneurship is the rate of return on shares in incumbent
ﬁrms in sectors where no innovation has occurred. Just prior to the boom, this is given by the








Note that since the short—term interest rate is zero over this phase, β(t)=β(Tv), ∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v).






=( 1− α)Γv. (61)
Free entry into entrepreneurship ensures that β(Tv) > (1 − α)Γv cannot obtain in equilibrium.
Provided that β(t) > 0, households will never choose to store ﬁnal output from within a cycle
to the beginning of the next either because it is dominated by the long—run rate of return on
claims to future proﬁts. However, unlike ﬁnal output, the return on stored intermediate output
in sectors with no entrepreneurial successes is strictly positive, because of the increase in its price
that occurs as a result of the boom. Even though there is a risk that the intermediate becomes
obsolete at the boom, if the anticipated price increase is suﬃciently large, households may choose
to purchase claims to intermediate output rather than claims to ﬁrm proﬁts.
If innovative activities are to be ﬁnanced at time t, it cannot be the case that households are
strictly better oﬀ buying claims to stored intermediate goods. In sectors with no entrepreneurial
23success, incumbent ﬁrms could sell such claims, use them to ﬁnance greater current production
and then store the good to sell at the beginning of the next boom when the price is higher. In
this case, since the cost of production is the same whether the good is stored or not, the rate of
return on claims to stored intermediates in sector i is logpi,v+1 /pi,v =( 1− α)Γv.
It follows that the long run rate of return on claims to ﬁrm proﬁts an instant prior to the
boom must satisfy
β(Tv) ≥ (1 − α)Γv. (62)
Free—entry into arbitrage ensures that β(Tv) < (1 − α)Γv cannot obtain in equilibrium. Because
there is a risk of obsolescence, this condition implies that at any time prior to the boom the
expected rate of return on claims to stored intermediates is strictly less than β(t).
Combining (61) and (62) yields the following implication of market clearing during the boom
for the long—run growth path:
Proposition 5 Asset market clearing at the boom requires that
β(Tv)=( 1− α)Γv. (63)
Asset market—clearing thus yields a unique relationship between the discount applied over the
boom, and productivity growth.22
The growth in output at the boom exceeds the growth in productivity for two reasons: ﬁrst
labor is re—allocated back into production, and second the previously unutilized capital is now




of their peak levels, output growth through the boom is given by
∆lnY (Tv)=( 1 − α)Γv +( 1− α)∆lnL + α∆lnKu




v − ln(1 − Hv) (64)
It follows directly from Proposition 5 that growth in output exceeds the discount factor across
the boom. Since proﬁts are proportional to output, this explains why ﬁrms are willing to delay
implementation during the downturn.
22Shleifer’s (1986) model featured multiple expectations—driven steady state cycles. Such multiplicity cannot
occur here because, unlike Shleifer, the possibility of storage that we allow forces a tight relationship between Γv
and ∆
E
v as depicted in Proposition 4. Since Γv,∆
E
v pairs must satisfy this restriction as well, in general, multiple
solutions cannot be found. This however does not rule out cycles of a qualitatively diﬀerent nature to those analyzed
here.
24The boom in output can be decomposed into a boom in consumption and investment. From





Notice that whether the growth in consumption exceeds the growth in productivity at the boom,
depends on the value of σ. In particular, if σ<1, consumption growth must exceed aggregate
productivity growth. Finally, since in the instant prior to the boom C (Tv)=Y (Tv),i tf o l l o w s













6 Optimal Behavior During the Cycle
Given the dynamics implied above, in this section we derive conditions which must be satisﬁed
in order for the posited behavior of capitalists and entrepreneurs to be optimal.
6.1 Optimal Entrepreneurship and Implementation
Equilibrium entrepreneurial behavior imposes the following requirements on our hypothesized
cycle:
• Successful entrepreneurs at time t = Tv must prefer to implement immediately, rather than




• Entrepreneurs who successfully innovate during the downturn must prefer to wait until the
beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier and sell at the limit price:
V I(t) <VD(t) ∀ t ∈ (TE
v ,T v) (E2)
• No entrepreneur wants to innovate during the slowdown of the cycle. Since in this phase of the
cycle δV D(t) <w (t), this condition requires that
δV I(t) <w (t) ∀ t ∈ (0,TE
v ) (E3)
The conditions on the value functions above take as given that entrepreneurs do not produce
in excess of current demand and store their output until the boom. Provided that the incumbent
25entrepreneur does not terminate the capital supply contract, (63) ensures that storage across
the boom is not optimal. However, since in the posited equilibrium the capital stock is being
under—utilized, it is possible that just before the boom a rival entrepreneur who has successfully
innovated may be able to “buy out” the contract and utilize all the capital, meeting the current
demand for output and storing the remainder until the boom.
This rival would not beneﬁt from taking over the capital contract of the incumbent under
identical terms. From (63), producing output and storing it until the boom is not optimal if he
must pay a constant amount ¯ q for capital. Moreover, under (E2) implementation and sale before
the boom is not optimal. However, the rival may be willing to take-over the use rights if able
to pay q for the amount Kc (t) as in the incumbent’s contract, and utilize extra units of idle
capital at some price e q<q. Clearly any e q>0 for the excess units would be amenable to the
capitalist. The most the rival will be willing to pay per period for the current capital is qK(TE
v ),
since e−β(Tv)q(Tv)=q. To buy out the contract, the rival must compensate the incumbent for
the loss of proﬁts sustained for the remainder of the cycle and must oﬀer the capitalist at least




v ) per period. It follows that such














The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for this to hold throughout the downturn:
Proposition 6 :I f
(1 − (1 − α)e−(1−α)γ)(1 − Hv)e−
ρ
σ∆E
v >α e −(1−α)γ (E4)
then entrepreneurs who successfully innovate during the downturn prefer to wait until the be-
ginning of the next cycle rather than displace the incumbent, produce now and store until the
boom.
In eﬀect, condition (E4) explains how it is possible for there to be under—utilized capital
during a recession even though there exist rivals who could potentially use the capital stock more
proﬁtably. The reason is that the capital stock is “lumpy”, so that the rival cannot use a part
of it while the incumbent continues to produce. For this reason the rival must compensate the
26incumbent for his proﬁt loss and this “endogenous” ﬁx e dc o s ti st o ol a r g ef o re n t r yt ob ep r o ﬁtable
under recessionary demand conditions. Entry does not become proﬁtable until the boom. There,
demand is high and entry costs low because the previous incumbent’s proﬁts do not need to be
compensated as they have already been destroyed by the implementation of a superior production
process.
Note ﬁnally that in constructing the equilibrium above we have implicitly imposed the re-
quirement that the downturn is not long enough that all sectors innovate. Thus the following
condition must be satisﬁed with strict inequality:
P(Tv) > 0. (E5)
Taken together conditions (E1) through (E5) are restrictions on entrepreneurial behavior that
must be satisﬁed for the cyclical growth path we have posited to be an equilibrium. However, we
must ﬁrst check that under these conditions, the contracts we have speciﬁed are indeed undomi-
nated.
6.2 The Optimality of Contracts
6.2.1 The Intermediate Good Supply Contract
The need for an intermediate contract arises because the lumpiness and sector speciﬁcity of
installed capital implies that only one intermediate producer can use the sector’s capital. Though
it is possible to commission the building of a new capital stock, if guaranteed a suﬃciently
high rental rate, the rental rate so required increases through the cycle, so that the threat of
entry provides progressively weaker restraint through time. By negotiating a contract before
the downturn, bids from the previous intermediate producer force limit pricing by the current
incumbent at a relatively low marginal cost, since at this time the cost of building replacement
capital is relatively low. Thus the intermediate goods contract guards the ﬁnal goods producers
against the increasing monopoly power of the incumbent through the downturn by pinning the
producer down to a price/quantity pair while the previous incumbent’s threat of entry is greatest.
Lemma 8 The contracted price sequence for intermediate i, pc
i(t), and quantity xc
i (t),f o rt ∈
[Tv−1,T v), satisfying (25) and (26) is optimal, given a sequence of input prices w(t),q(t) for
t ∈ [Tv−1,T v) faced by the previous incumbent.
27The input price for labor, w(t) is determined in the per period spot market so it remains now to
determine the sequence of capital prices.
6.2.2 The Capital Supply Contract
The aim of capital supply contracts is to forestall hold-up by the capitalist, but the contract’s
“reach” is limited on the entrepreneur’s side. Unlike capital which is inﬁnitely lived, entrepreneurs
lose their productive advantage when displaced by superior producers, so that they cannot make
unconditional promises to purchase capital into the indeﬁnite future. All contracts are thus
contingent upon the entrepreneur’s continuing production. We show now that the earlier posited
contract comprising (27) and (28) is an optimal response to the posited behavior of other agents
over the cycle:
Proposition 7 Provided (E1)—(E5) hold then, in each sector i, at the boom of every cycle (Tv,
v =1 ...∞), an equilibrium contract for the capitalist and leading entrepreneur is a sequence of
prices qc (t) and capital Kc (t) for all t ∈ [Tv,T v+1) that satisﬁes (27) and (28).
Note that the cyclical equilibrium is supported by the limitations on contracting that we
have imposed. The critical, and we think realistic, assumption is that only future prices and
quantities can be contracted ex ante. Allowing for a richer set of contracting possibilities would
overturn this result. The sort of environments required would need to allow that, in addition
to a time varying price q and quantity K for capital, it would be possible to condition transfers
between the parties on other actions that they or other parties take. For example if the new
incumbent entrepreneur (who arrives probabilistically in the downturn) could somehow be party
to the contract at time Tv, then full utilization of the capital through the downturn could also be
contracted ex ante. Such a rich contracting environment, however, seems to require unrealistically
complex and diﬃcult to observe details to be enforceable between the parties. Thus endogenous
underutilization, which corresponds to that observed in actual business cycles, arises here due to
seemingly natural limitations in contracting.
7 The Stationary Cyclical Growth Path
Here we characterize the stationary cyclical growth path implied by Propositions 2 to 5. To allow
a stationary representation, we normalize all aggregate by dividing by ¯ Av−1 and denote the result
28with lower case variables.
First recall from Proposition 2, that the dynamics of the economy during the expansion are
analagous to those in the Ramsey model without technological change. Let cv = c(TE
v ) and
kv = k(TE
v ) denote the normalized values of consumption and capital at the peak of the vth
expansion. Given initial values c0(Tv−1) and k0(Tv−1), and an expansion length ∆X
v , it is possible
to summarize the expansion as follows:
cv = f(c0(Tv−1),k 0(Tv−1),∆X
v ) (68)
kv = g(c0(Tv−1),k 0(Tv−1),∆X
v ), (69)
where f(·) and g(·) are well—deﬁned functions. Since capital accumulation stops in the recession,




v−1 in the recession. When combined with its increase at the boom, from (65), this













































Finally, asset market clearing over the boom (conditions (58) to (61)) imply:
δvI








0 = V I
0 (Tv−1)/ ¯ Av−1 is explicitly derived in the appendix.
In the stationary cycle Γv = Γ,k v = k, cv = c, ∆E
v = ∆E and ∆X
v = ∆X for all v. Imposing
29these on the equations above, yields a system of ﬁve equations in the ﬁve unknowns:































0(c,k,Γ,∆E,∆X)=( 1 − α)e−(1−α)γe−αΓkα. (79)
We demonstrate existence of the stationary cycle, and analyze this system numerically in
the next section. However, the dynamics of the model can be understood heuristically from the






















Figure 4: Phase Diagram
The economy does not evolve along the standard stable trajectory of the Ramsey model
terminating at the steady state, S. Instead, the evolution of the cycling economy during the
expansion is depicted by the path between A and B in the ﬁgure. Capital is accumulated starting
at the point k0 corresponding to point A in the diagram, according to (37) and (38). The point
30k0 denotes the inherited capital stock at the boom. Accumulation ends at k
¡
TE¢
,a tw h i c hp o i n t
investment stops until the next cycle. Note that if allowed to continue along such a path the
economy would eventually violate transversality, but capital accumulation stops and consumption
declines so that the economy evolves from B to C through the downturn. During this phase, the
dynamics of the economy are no longer dictated by the Ramsey phase diagram. When this
phase ends, implementation of stored productivity improvements occurs at the next boom, and
¯ A increases, so that k fall discretely. If σ<1, consumption grows by more than productivity at
the boom, so that c rises discretely. The boom is therefore depicted by the dotted arrow back
to point A. At this point, investment in the expansionary phase recommences for the next cycle.
The connection between the two phases of the cycle arises due to the allocation of resources to
entrepreneurship. This allocation of resources will be reﬂected in the size of the increment to ¯ A,
Γ.
7.1 Existence of the Stationary Cycle
To demonstrate the existence of the stationary cycle, we numerically solve the model for various
combinations of parameters and check the existence conditions (E1)—(E5). We choose parameters
to fall within reasonable bounds of known values, and present a baseline case given in Table 1:







The parameters α and γ were chosen so as to obtain a labor share of 0.7, a capital share of 0.2 and
ap r o ﬁts h a r eo f0.1. These values correspond approximately to those estimated by Atkeson and
Kehoe (2002). The value of γ corresponds to a markup rate of around 15%. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 1
σ is slightly high, but we solve for various values below, including σ =1 .
Given σ =0 .79, we calibrated δ and ρ so as to match a long—run annual growth rate of 2.2% and
an average risk—free real interest rate of 3.8%, values which correspond to annual data for the








and kv =7 .668. In this, and all simulations we have computed, steady state values are unique.23
Numerically simulated value functions are plotted for the baseline case in Figure 5. The ﬁgure
allows direct veriﬁcation of conditions E1, E2, and E3.24
The plot starts with implementation at a boom, when V I >V D and w/δ. For a discrete
interval, V I remains above V D implying that, in the event of entrepreneurial success, implemen-
tation would dominate delay. However, over this part of the phase, the relative value of labor
in production, w/δ, exceeds returns to entrepreneurship, so that no entrepreneurial successes are
available to implement. Throughout this expansionary phase, investment occurs so that the wage
continues to rise. At the same time, V D is also rising because the time u n t i li m p l e m e n t a t i o no fe n -
trepreneurial successes falls. Note that this increase in V D is simply a function of discounting, i.e.,
the ensuing boom at which stored successes will be implemented is drawing closer. Throughout
this phase V I declines as the duration of guaranteed positive proﬁts falls.
The end of the expansion corresponds to the commencement of entrepreneurship, i.e., when
the increasing value of a delayed entrepreneurial success eventually meets the opportunity cost
23Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) explicitly establish uniqueness of the stationary cycle when capital accumulation
is not allowed. It seems likely that the introduction of capital would not lead to an additional stationary cycle
here, but we have not been able to establish this analytically.
24Condition E4 and E5 are not depicted but can be directly checked.
32of labor in production. This corresponds to the point at which w/δ = V D. Since V D rose due to
discounting during the expansion, during the contraction, when capital is no longer accumulated
and interest rates are zero, V D remains constant. This implies that, by arbitrage, the wage must
also be constant, until the contraction ends. Through the downturn V I continues to fall, but
must eventually rise again as the probability of remaining the incumbent at the boom, given that
an entrepreneurial success has not arrived in one’s sector, increases. This increase in V I is the
force that will eventually trigger the next boom that ends the recession. It occurs when V I just
exceeds V D and entrepreneurs implement stored entrepreneurial successes, leading to an increase
in productivity, a jump in demand, movement of labor back to production, and full capacity
utilization.
Table 2 lists the numerical implications for growth, cycle length and terminal values of capital
stocks for various combinations of parameter values, including the baseline case. A ﬁrst thing
to note is the extreme sensitivity of cycle length, ∆ = ∆X + ∆E, to changes in parameters. In
contrast, the long—run growth rate is much less sensitive to changes in parameters than along
the acyclical growth path. Generally, increases in parameters that directly raise the impact of
entrepreneurship, δ and γ, increase the growth rate, as in the acyclical steady state. Changes
in σ and ρ also have eﬀects similar to those present in the acyclical steady state. Additionally,
however, changes in these parameters alter cycle length in ways which counterveil, and sometimes
overshadow, the direct eﬀects. For example, increasing σ, lowering inter-temporal substitutability,
generally induces lower growth in the acyclical steady state because consumers are less willing to
delay consumption to the future. A similar eﬀect is present here. However, as the table shows,
this increase also raises cycle length and amplitude, inducing more entrepreneurship and a larger
boom. The net eﬀect, as the table shows, is an increase in growth rate for this conﬁguration. A
similar sequence of eﬀects is present for increases in ρ. Increasing the capital share, α,i n c r e a s e s
capital accumulation and lowers interest rates, but because this also induces a shorter cycle length,
the net eﬀect is a fall in growth rate.
Values of σ closer to 1 do not satisfy our existence conditions given the values of other
parameters assumed in the baseline case. However, if we allow δ to rise somewhat, higher values
of σ a r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ec y c l e( s e et h el a s tt w or o w so fT a b l e2 ) . I n t u i t i v e l y ,w i t hh i g h e r
entrepreneurial productivity, both the size of booms and the average growth rate tend to be
higher in equilibrium. As a result, households are willing to delay consumption enough even for
33low elasticities of intertemporal substitution. As can be seen, the long—run growth rate in such
cases tends to be higher and the cycles shorter.
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7.2 Qualitative Behavior of Key Variables
7.2.1 Investment and Consumption
Investment is strongly pro-cyclical here. Contemporaneous with the productivity boom, invest-
ment jumps discretely to its highest point in the cycle. It remains positive throughout the expan-
sionary phase and then declines sharply as the economy enters recession. Note importantly that
the driving force for investment here is the marginal product of capital in production: investment
is zero in the recession when interest rates are zero, and jumps to its highest point at the start
of the boom, when interest rates are at their highest level.25 Consumption is also strongly pro-
cyclical, but evolves more smoothly than investment At the boom, consumption jumps discretely,
and continues to increase throughout the expansionary phase. Consumption falls smoothly in the
recession and continues to decline throughout the downturn until the next boom.
The model also generates pro-cyclical allocation of labor to production of consumables and
investment goods, as has been reported (e.g. Christiano and Fisher 1995). Although the invest-
ment and consumption good sectors are not distinguished, per se, in the model, the allocation
of labor to consumption good production can be inferred from equation (65). As long as σ<1
25Output and sales’ growth closely follow investment, whereas investment has almost no relationship, at business
cycle frequencies, with the user cost of capital; see Hassett and Hubbard (1996).
34consumption growth exceeds productivity growth so that the allocation of labor and capital to
consumption must have risen at the boom. The reason labor in both consumption and investment
good production can rise is because of the endogenous shutting down of entrepreneurship at the
boom. This mechanism is similar to that generated by introducing “homework” in Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991).
7.2.2 Productivity
Even though underlying productivity improvements arise in a decentralized and time-varying
manner across sectors, the incentives for strategic delay identiﬁed here lead to simultaneous im-
plementation at the boom. Consequently total factor productivity (TFP) rises uniformly there.
Output jumps discretely at the boom also, in part, due to the reallocation of additional resources
to production then. The eﬀects of the productivity boom persist in further output increases, as
capital is then accumulated through the expansion. Note that it is not optimal to accumulate
capital before the boom because its short term returns there are zero. It is this delayed accumu-
lation of capital in response to the productivity boom which leads to a prolonged expansion in
output. This is consistent with the evidence that expansions tend to start with relatively aggres-
sive growth, and are then followed by milder increases thereafter (see Dahl and Gonzalez—Rivera,
2003).
In the expansion, all labor is used in production and capital is fully utilized. In the contraction,
labor is reallocated to entrepreneurial activity, capital utilization falls, and output declines.26 If
utilized capital and labor were correctly measured this would imply that measured productivity
should remain constant through the recession. As already discussed, capacity utilization is well
known to fall in recessions. However, even if capital utilization is correctly measured in US data,
but labor allocated to innovation is not fully measured, then it will appear that labor is being
hoarded (see Fay and Medoﬀ 1985).27 If this occurs, measured productivity would fall, which is
consistent with the evidence (see for example Fernald and Basu 1999). Even if entrepreneurship
is being correctly measured, but the fall in capital utilization is not, measured productivity falls.
26The fall in output does not result from failure to measure the productive contribution of entrepreneurs alone.
Even if this were fully measured, which is unlikely to be the case, output would still fall since during the contraction.
The reallocation of labor from production, where workers are paid less than their marginal value (due to proﬁts),
to entrepreneurship, which if measured correctly implies workers being paid marginal value, will lead to a decline
in measured output.
27Entrepreneurship is, at best, likely to be only partially measured in the data, since much of it involves activities
that will raise long-term ﬁrm proﬁts but have little directly recorded output value contemporaneously.
35Through the expansion, total factor productivity is constant, and labor productivity rises.
7.2.3 Returns to Factors
In US data, corporate proﬁts increase mildly through upturns but show clear and marked falls in
contractions. This is again consistent with the model. As productivity is unchanged through the
cycle, equation (21) shows proﬁtt ob ep r o p o r t i o n a lt od e m a n d ,s ot h a tt h ep a t t e r no fp r o ﬁts will
be consistent with this pro—cyclical pattern. Wages rise rapidly in the boom due to the increase
in labor productivity. The wage then continues to increase throughout the expansionary phase
as capital is accumulated, but is constant through the contraction. This is because the marginal
product of labor in production is constant. Competition does not put downward pressure on wages
because labor in this phase enters into its alternative activity, entrepreneurship or reorganization.
The wage then here is best interpreted as the skilled wage, since it is assumed that all labor is
equally able to work in entrepreneurship. The introduction of unskilled labor, which has no role in
these tasks, would see a similar increase in wages (and full employment) through the economy’s
upturn and then a decline (in either wages, and/or employment if labor market frictions are
modeled) during the recession.
7.2.4 The Term Spread
In US data the spread between interest rates on a ten year treasury note and a three month
treasury bill tends to be large in recessions (i.e. the long term interest rate exceeds the short
term). In expansions smaller and seems to be a good predictor of recessions. In particular,
relatively low values of the term spread, high short term interest rates relative to long, suggest
a higher probability of recession. The cycle analyzed here exhibits a low value of the yield curve
through the expansion, and a high value in the recession. The highest value of the yield curve is at
the start of the recession. Towards the end of the recession it tracks down as the three month rate
starts to include the increased discount over the boom. This implies, particular for short cycles
in the model, a good ﬁt with the data. Estrella and Mishkin (1996) argue that the yield curve is
a superior predictor over other leading indicators at leads from 2 to 4 quarters. Similarly, at the
start of the expansion the value of the yield curve is at its lowest point, thus again providing a
leading indication of the imminent contraction to follow the expansionary phase.
367.2.5 Tobin’s Q
The market value of a marginal unit of capital to its replacement cost is pro—cyclical in our cycle.
It is equal to one during an expansion and zero during a contraction when capital is under—
utilized. However, the aggregate behavior of Tobin’s (average) Q,d e ﬁned as the ratio of the
value of ﬁrms to the book value of their capital stock, is somewhat more complicated. In our





where Π(t) denotes the stock market value of the intangible capital tied up in ﬁrms, and recall
that V K(t) is the market value of their physical capital.
During an expansion V K(t)=K(t) and, the value of intangible capital with the value of






Since V I(t) declines and K(t) grows during the expansion, Q(t) must decline.










v ) <K (TE
v ). (82)
Also some sectors experience innovations, so there exist terminal ﬁrms who are certain to be
made obsolete at the next round of innovation.A ta n yp o i n ti nt i m et h em e a s u r eo fs e c t o r si n
which no innovation has occurred is P(t), therefore the total value of ﬁrms on the stockmarket is
given by
Π(t)=( 1− P(t))[V T(t)+V D(t)] + P(t)V I(t), (83)
where V T(t) denotes the value of “terminal” ﬁrms who are certain to be made obsolete during
t h en e x tw a v eo fi m p l e m e n t a t i o n .T h ev a l u eo ft h e s eﬁrms can be written as




Substituting into (83) yields








37Through the downturn, the value of intangible capital initial falls and then rises again as the
economy approaches the next boom.28 Immediately prior to the boom P(t)=P(Tv),s ot h a t
again Π(Tv)=V I(Tv).T h ev a l u eo fQ during the downturn is thus given by
Q(t)=¯ q(1 − Hv)
Z Tv
t




∀ t ∈ [TE
v ,T v) (86)
During the contraction, then, Q(t) initially declines as K(t) remains unchanged and the the
decline in V k(t) dominates. However, eventually the growth in the value of intangible capital,
ˆ Π(t), starts to dominate as we approach the boom, so that Q(t) rises in anticipation. At the
boom, since the book value of capital remains unchanged, but the market value of both physical
and capital growth by a factor e(1−α)Γv,T o b i n ’ sQ rises rapidly.
The qualitative behavior of Tobin’s Q in our model thus accords quite well with its aggregate
counterpart in US data. As illustrated by Caballero (1999, Figure 2.1), Tobin’s Q tends to reach a
peak prior to the peak of expansions and then reaches a minimum midway through NBER—dated
recessions. The most rapid periods of growth in Tobin’s Q therefore start to occur before the end
of recessions and continue through the subsequent boom just as they do in our stationary cycle.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The basic mechanism underlying the model discussed in this paper captures a simple and com-
pelling reason for cross-sectoral co—movement: entrepreneurs delay innovative activity (or reorga-
nization) until demand conditions are slack, and delay implementing productivity improvements
until the point at which demand conditions are favorable and the costs of acquiring the neces-
sary capital are suﬃciently low – this is when other entrepreneurs are doing the same. Since
ensuing prices must also satisfy consumers’ optimization and asset market clearing when there is
the possibility of storage and arbitrage trading, this does not lead to the possibility of multiple
self-fulﬁlling cycles. Moreover, these conditions do not rule out cycles because the re—allocation
of resources inherent to the process of endogenous growth ensures that proﬁts grow more than
the discount rate across the boom.
The model generates movements in aggregates over the cycle which are qualitatively similar
in many respects to those observed in US data. It should be reiterated that these results arise in a
framework where both the economy’s cyclical behavior and its growth path are fully endogenized.
28This cyclical anticipation of future proﬁts implicit in aggregate stock prices accords well with the ﬁndings of
Hall (2001).
38Moreover, the framework we explore has remarkably few degrees of freedom; the model is fully
speciﬁed by ﬁve exogenous parameters: two summarizing household preferences, two underlying
the productivity of entrepreneurship, and one pinning down factor shares in production. We
do not claim that the current framework is capable of providing a quantitative account of the
business cycle. However, in future work we will build on this parsimonious structure to explore
a number of key extensions:
• Aggregate uncertainty and stochastic cycle lengths – The length and other characteristics of
actual business cycles, vary from cycle to cycle and look rather diﬀerent from the deterministic
stationary equilibrium cycle described here. Introducing some degree of aggregate uncertainty
would help to address this. However, in order to develop such an extension we need to develop
a deeper understanding of the local transitional dynamics of the model. It turns out that these
dynamics are not as complex as one might expect at ﬁrst blush. The reason is that the path
back to the stationary cycle (at least locally) involves the accumulation of only one factor: either
physical capital or intangible. Although a full analysis of these local dynamics is beyond the
scope of the current paper, we believe it is feasible.
• Unemployment – A natural way to introduce unemployment into the model is to allow for
unskilled labour which cannot be used in entrepreneurship and is not directly substitutable with
skilled labor in production. With putty—clay production, the marginal value of this unskilled
labor falls to zero during the downturn and some fraction of unskilled workers would become
unemployed (just like physical capital). In a competitive labor market, this would drive unskilled
wages down to their reservation level. However, in the presence of labor market imperfections,
such as eﬃciency wages and search frictions, the dynamics of unemployment and wages interact
with the process of creative destruction in a more complex manner. In further work we explore
these dynamics more fully.
• Government policy – The framework developed here (as well as its extensions) provide a
natural framework for thinking about counter—cyclical policy. First, the question arises as to
whether removing or reducing cycles is a valid policy objective at all. In Francois and Lloyd—
Ellis (2003) we showed that switching from the cyclical equilibrium to a corresponding acyclical
one would raise long—run growth but lower welfare. Similar results are likely to carry over the
stationary cycle in the current model. A second issue is that of how to implement a counter—
cyclical policy. The recession here is Keynesian in that it is associated with deﬁcient demand,
39and the government could intervene, for example, by raising demand for goods and services and
taxing savings. However, such a policy would eﬀectively channel resources away from innovative
activities and may dampen growth. On the other hand the anticipation of higher demand during
a downturn might stimulate innovation, so the overall eﬀect is unclear.
409 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Diﬀerentiating (5) with respect to time yields
˙ V K
i (t)=r(t)V K
i (t) − qi (t)Ki (t)+ ˙ Ki (t)= ˙ Ki (t). (87)
Since V k
i (t)=Ki (t), (18) follows.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :Given factor prices q(t) and w(t), entrepreneurs choose the combination

















































Since the productivity of the most productive rival is e−γAi(t), the limit price is given by (20).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Using (19) and (20) to substitute for xi and pi into (88) yields Ki = K,





w(t)=( 1 − α)e−(1−α)γY (t). (91)
Since q(t)=r(t) > 0, accumulating capital dominates storage, so that:
˙ K(t)=Y (t) − C(t), (92)










Since, innovation occurs in every period, free entry into entrepreneurship implies that
δV I(t)=w(t). (95)
41Along the balanced growth path, all aggregates grow at the rate g. From the Euler equation it
follows that
r(t)=ρ + σg. (96)
Diﬀerenting (91) and (95) w.r.t. to time, using these to substitute for
˙ V I(t)
V I(t) in (94), and using
(96) to substitute for r(t) and (21) to sustitute for π(t),w eg e t





(1 − α)e−(1−α)γ + g. (97)
Solving for g yields (24).¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is
credible, other entrepreneurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1) entrepreneurs have no
incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that i
has a productivity advantage which is eγ times better than the existing incumbent. If continuing
to innovate in that sector, another entrepreneur will, with positive probability, also develop a
productive advantage of eγ. Such an innovation yields expected proﬁt of 0, since, in developing
their improvement, they do not observe the non-implemented improvements of others, so that
both ﬁrms Bertrand compete with the same technology. Returns to attempting innovation in
another sector where there has been no signal of success, or from simply working in production,
w(t) > 0, are thus strictly higher.
Part (2): If success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further innovation
in their sector will cease from Part (1) by their sending of a costless signal. They are thus
indiﬀerent between falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal.
Thus, there exists a signalling equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of
success.¥

















42which re-arranges to (36).¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :Suppose instead that there exists an intermediate phase in which neither
capital is accumulated nor entrepreneurship occurs. Consider the ﬁrst instant of that phase. Since
in the instant prior to that capital was being accumulated, the marginal return to investment in
physical capital must exceed ρ. Since the marginal product of capital cannot jump downwards
discretely at full capital utilization, there are only two possibilities: either (1) r(TE
v )=ρ at
the start of the intermediate phase or (2) r(TE
v ) >ρat the start of the intermediate phase.
Situation (2) can be ruled out directly since, by assumption, in the intermediate phase there is
no entrepreneurship, and so it must be the case that r>ρand investment will occur. Situation
(1) occurs if the marginal return to capital converges continuously to r = ρ along the neoclassical
accumulation phase. But this corresponds exactly with the path of accumulation along the stable
trajectory of the Ramsey model which does not converge in ﬁnite time – this would then imply
an inﬁnite length to the capital accumulation phase.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Given the constant wage wv and the average rental rate on capital
through the downturn, ¯ q,t h ee ﬃcient contract will be constructed so as to solve the following
cost—minimization problem through the downturn:
min
˜ Ki,˜ Li
wv˜ Li +¯ q ˜ Ki s.t. ˜ xi ≤ ˜ Kα
i (Ai˜ Li)1−α (100)
where ˜ Li =
R Tv
TE




i (t)dt and ˜ xi =
R Tv
TE
v xi(t)dt. This temporal aggregation is
possible for two reasons: (1) the interest rate is zero through the downturn and intermediate
prices are constant, so that the value of a unit of output is time—independent, and (2) as labour
is withdrawn from production, the capital labour ratio is constant. Thus the entire downturn can



















Since the capital labour ratio through the downturn must equal that at the peak and the wage
is constant through the downturn, it follows that the eﬃcient contract must satisfy ¯ q = q(TE
v ).¥
43P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :From (35), long—run productivity growth is given by
Γv =( 1− P (Tv))γ (103)












Substitution into (103) and integrating gives (56).¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 :pi(t)=
q(t)αw(t)1−α
µe−(1−α)γA1−α
i (t) is the marginal cost of the previous incumbent
given the sequence w(t),q(t). Due to the unit elasticity of ﬁnal producer demand, intermediate
producing entrepreneurs wish to set price as high as possible. Thus, contracting a lower price at
any instant is not optimal for the leader in i. Oﬀering a pc
i (t) >p i (t) in any instant would lead
to a bid by the previous incumbent that would be both feasible and preferred by the ﬁnal good
producer. Thus pc




i(t)for all t ∈ [Tv,T v+1).¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 : If V k
i (t) >K i (t) it is feasible for the leading producer to write an
alternative {qi (t),K i(τ)} with the builder of a new capital stock in sector i which would lead
to new capital being constructed and which would be preferred by the producer. A preferred
sequence for the leading producer would be one in which prices were no higher than the contracted
sequence above, but which had a strictly lower price in at least one instant. This is feasible if
V k
i (t) >K i (t). Finally, no new capitalist would enter oﬀering a sequence V k
i (t) <K i (t), so that
any equilibrium price sequence must at least satisfy (50).¥


























































v )dτ ≥ αe−(1−α)γ(Tv − t)
44Since this holds with equality at t = Tv,as u ﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o ni st h a tt h el e f th a n ds i d ed e c l i n e s
more rapidly with t than the right hand side. That is
(1 − (1 − α)e−(1−α)γ)(1 − Hv)e−
ρ
σ(t−TE
v ) >α e −(1−α)γ (105)
This will hold for all t if holds for t = Tv. Hence, condition (E4) follows.¥
Proof of Proposition 7: The proof proceeds by demonstrating that there does not exist another
mutually improving price/quantity sequence that could be written at time Tv. Note ﬁr s tt h a ti n
considering alternative contracts we can restrict attention to those that also satisfy Lemma 7.
Since contracts not satisfying this will always be dominated by alternatives that do so for at
least one of the parties. Since qc (t)=r(t) for t ≤ TE
v and Kc (t) satisﬁes (37), there is no
potential for mutually beneﬁcial changes in the terms of the contract through the upturn, as




















v ) remains idle every instant, utilization is not eﬃcient, which indicates
a possibly improving contract. We show that no such contract exists.
If the entrepreneur does not store intermediate, there is no demand for the idle capital be-
cause Kc (t) meets production needs. Even free use of excess capital to produce and sell more
intermediate output at any instant τ during the downturn would be rejected due to the unit
elasticity of demand. That is, since total revenue remains ﬁxed at pi(t)xd
i(t)=Y (t), producing
more simply incurs extra labor costs with unchanged revenues.
Now consider alternative sequences under which the entrepreneur may store some output, and
which increase capital utilization. Entrepreneurs will never choose to store output beyond the
boom when a new incumbent has arrived. If competing with a new incumbent, pricing at the new




i (t+1) which is less than the price if selling




















i (t +1 )=e2γA1−α
i (t − 1). Thus, terminal entrepreneurs strictly prefer to sell stored output
before the boom. Proposition 5 ensures the same holds for an entrepreneur who expects to remain
the incumbent at the boom.
Capitalists may be willing to modify the contract to allow storage if they receive a positive




v ) which lies idle in the equilibrium contract.
We show now that capitalists would only accept a rent of q, on the extra units. To see why,
45suppose that the capitalist were to accept a modiﬁed contract which maintained the price q for
units Kc (t) but allowed a lower price e q for utilization of the idle units. Given such a contract the
entrepreneur would optimally choose to meet contracted production at each t by utilizing Kc (t)




v ) to produce and store output. The














i (t) is the optimal amount of labor to use at time t. Recall that shutting down production
is always an available option for the entrepreneur. The RHS of (106) is the stored output produced
using the extra capital up to τ and the LHS is the demand for output under the contract with the
ﬁnal goods producer from τ on. By utilizing the extra units of capital at e q<q the entrepreneur
simply replaces future demand for capital at price q with stored output produced using capital
priced at e q and thus lowers costs. Note also that a similar path of storage and shut down would
be chosen for a non-stationary price on the extra units, e q(t), provided that, for some instants at
least, e q(t) < q.
Now consider returns to the capitalist from such a deviation. There are two cases to consider
depending on whether there has been an entrepreneurial success in sector i or not. If there has not
been a success up to time t>τ,which occurs with probability Pi (t), then demand for capital at
t =0 . As already established, the entrepreneur shuts down at τ in (106) under this deviation, so
that his demand is zero. Moreover the previous incumbent cannot sell output to the ﬁnal goods
sector since the current incumbent has contracted sale to the ﬁnal goods sector, under (25) (26).
Thus the previous incumbent (and all earlier) have zero demand for capital for t<T v. However,
with probability (1 − Pi (t)) there has been a success in sector i at time t. In that case a single
entrepreneur has some use for the capital before the boom. But note that it is not essential for
him to access capital then, since he does not have an intermediate delivery contract yet, and along
the equilibrium path will wait for implementation until the boom. Since such an individual is the
only producer with demand for the capital, she is able to drive the capitalist down to marginal
cost, which implies a price q(t) → 0 over the interval t ∈ [τ,Tv+1], where τ solves (106), under
this deviation. Since this yields strictly lower returns for the capitalist than (27)(28) a deviation
allowing intermediate storage will not be accepted by the capitalist.
It thus follows that any alternative contract which allows utilization of capital in the downturn
above Kc (t) cannot be mutually improving. Since Kc (t) is the maximal contracted level of capital
46possible, and any alternative rental rate necessarily makes one party worse oﬀ,t h ec o n t r a c t
(qc (t),Kc (t)) is not dominated by an alternative contract that could be written at Tv.
There is ﬁnally the possibility of remaining uncontracted, which would be preferred by the
capitalist. But, since this would allow for a strictly increasing unit price for capital through the
downturn, in accordance with (49), this would be rejected by the entrepreneur. If the sector’s
capital owner refused to contract, the entrepreneur would contract capital to be built with another
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